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Abstract 
This study examines a mathematical model to determine the timing and consequently volume of transactions to 
be audited in a continuous audit system to detect potentially fraudulent transactions. The interactions between 
the audit system and a potential fraudster are modeled as Continuous Time Markov Chain and the transition 
probabilities from one state to another are determined using game theoretic approach. We believe that such a 
model has the potential to be deployed in an audit system to detect potentially fraudulent or malicious 
transactions. In this research, the information system is modeled as a continuous time Markov chain (CTMC), 
where the transition from one state to another occurs due to actions of a person with malicious intent. The 
present state of the system depends only on the past state. At each state, the fraudster can either continue with the 
next step in the fraud or can cease and desist from the fraud. The interaction between the actions of the audit 
module and fraudster is modeled as a two-player simultaneous zero-sum game and the probability of transition 
from one state to another is derived from the payoff table. This payoff will be decided by the outcome of a game 
theoretic model. A sensitivity analysis showed that when an organization has strong anti-fraud controls, the 
probability of fraud decreases and the need for frequent audit decreases. The limitations of the model are that, 
the game theory model assumes a zero-sum game where the payoffs are known and certain. 
Keywords: Continuous Audit Systems, Game Theory, Audit Timing, Fraud prevention, Sensitivity analysis.  
 
1. Introduction 
During the last decade, continuous audit systems (CAS) have become widely used in large transaction 
processing systems (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2006; 2009). These systems are defined as “a continuous 
(concurrent) monitoring technique in which a set of programmed modules are directly integrated into the 
organization's application system” (Groomer and Murthy, 2003).  
In a manual audit, the scope and scale of the audit procedures is limited by the amount of physical data that an 
auditor can process. CAS can process vastly more data than what can be handled by manual means. However, 
this increase in scale and scope of data poses its own set of problems. If the CAS scans too much data it will find 
a lot of spurious items of interest, or false positives. Scan too little data and the CAS finds only trivial issues that 
would just as easily have been detected by manual means. This key issue regarding the timing and volume of 
transactions to be examined is highlighted in the problem statement below. 
Consider the problem of access controls in a database. Operating system objects, such as files, are unrelated 
items, whereas records, fields, and elements of a database are related. Although a user cannot determine the 
contents of one file by reading others, a user might be able to determine one data element just by reading others. 
The ability to determine data values from other related data values is called inference (Weber, 1998). 
This could happen in two ways. One is by using “Context Dependent” queries. Using diverse set of queries, a 
user may be able to infer data that would not normally be available to him. In order to secure against such 
improper access, access is restricted to all contextual references to data with higher security. For example, even 
though a user may not have access to income data of customers, he may query the database and obtain a list of 
customer making high value purchases, which allows him to infer the income of the customer. The second way 
is by using “History Dependent” queries. Here a user may construct a series of queries in such a way that each 
query and its answer does not violate the security policy. But all the answers of these queries together would 
give her information, for which she is not authorized (Weber, 1998). 
A similar problem arises when a malicious user attempts a fraud in an accounting system. Usually, in order to 
perpetrate the fraud, the user must succeed in creating a series of false entries, over a period of time that 
ultimately results in financial loss to an organization. Each fraudulent entry in itself does not necessarily cause a 
loss, and may not trigger an alert from the CAS in the early stages. However, at a later stage, by analyzing the 
series of transactions entered by that user, the audit module is in a better position to flag a transaction as a 
potentially fraudulent.  
To prevent these leakages of information or loss, the CAS must keep track of the queries or transactions that 
each user has run in the past. However, the key question is how far back the audit module has to scan to 
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determine if an attempt has been made to violate information security. Or to put it differently, how much and 
how soon must the audit module scan the history of a user’s actions to determine potential fraud. 
In this paper, we use game theoretic and stochastic modeling tools to determine the length of time for which the 
audit module must scan the past history of transactions. To determine this, one needs a metric which tells the 
module the amount of time it takes to violate an information system. We model the interactions between the user 
(“the fraudster”) who wishes to obtain data to which she is not privileged and the audit module using a stochastic 
model, where the decision to commit the fraud is based on the payoffs determined by a game theory model.  
 
2. Literature Review 
Reliability of a system is usually measured by estimating how long a system can operate without failing, usually 
termed as mean time to failure, or mean time between failures. This enables one to measure reliability in terms of 
a behavior that can be perceived by the user. Users are more interested in the measures of reliability in terms of 
failure rate rather than knowing it in terms of its static features, properties, or mode of construction (Littlewood 
et al., 1993). Though such static features, properties or mode of construction do influence reliability, they are not 
adequate in themselves to determine reliability. In a similar vein, feature set, design philosophy of firewalls, 
intrusion detection systems and access controls systems are not enough to determine whether a particular system 
is capable of maintaining integrity or confidentiality of data. What is required is a measure of actual achieved 
information integrity, analogous to how mean time to failure is used, as a yardstick for measuring reliability 
(Littlewood et al., 1993). 
One of the earliest attempts to quantify security was taken by Littlewood et al., (1993), who commented on the 
scarcity of literature on the probabilistic treatment of system security. Littlewood et al., (1993) drew an analogy 
between the problem of reliability and problem of security, and elucidated on the similarities and differences. 
They pointed out that the key difference between reliability and security is the presence of malicious threats in 
the security domain.  
Another early attempt at quantification of information security metrics was undertaken by Ortalo, Deswarte, and 
Kaâniche (1999). They attempted to provide a quantitative assessment system security level at a point in time.  
They modeled system vulnerabilities as a privilege graph, where each arc in the graph is assigned a weight that 
estimates the degree of effort required by a potential attacker to make a move from a less privileged state to 
another with greater privileges. They setup an experimental system to capture data on actual system 
vulnerabilities and attempts to circumvent controls.  
These early researchers concentrated on measuring static measures that measure actual security at a point in time. 
They fail to take into account the fact that once a vulnerability has been identified, administrators take steps to 
fix that vulnerability and concurrently, attackers modify their behavior and seek other vulnerabilities. To address 
this dynamic nature of the security modeling, researchers have resorted to game theory.   
The use of game theory to model information security issues is fairly recent. Hamilton, Miller, and Saydjari 
(2002) pointed out that it is possible to formulate attack and defense scenarios as a game of moves and counter 
moves. Game theory already has algorithms to predict the likelihood an action would be selected in such 
scenarios. Alpcan and Başar (2003) pointed out that game theory provides a rich set of tools for modeling and 
analyzing information security issues. These game theoretic tools can also be used to develop practical and cost 
effective solutions that can be implemented in the real world. Alpcan and Başar (2003) modeled an Intrusion 
Detection System (IDS) as a network of sensors. They modeled the behavior of an attacker and the IDS as a two-
person, nonzero-sum, noncooperative game. They applied game theoretic concepts to develop a formal decision 
and control framework for a platform-independent IDS.  
Lye and Wing (2005) constructed a two-player stochastic game to represent the interaction between a system 
administrator and an attacker. They computed the Nash equilibria or best response strategies for the attacker and 
administrator. They used a two-player game model and pointed out that a team of attackers or team of 
administrators can be modeled as a single omnipresent attacker or defender. Thus, a two player game is 
sufficient for the modeling problems of information security.  
Liu, Zang, and Yu (2005) used a game-theoretic approach to inferring attacker intent, objectives, and strategies 
(AIOS) and captured the inherent interdependency between AIOS and defender objectives. The authors were 
primarily interested in examining the characteristics of attackers rather than attacks themselves. The attacker’s 
intent is modeled using game theoretic models. They make the case that the attacker’s intent can be inferred from 
the nature of the attack and this in turn influences the nature of defense strategy to be adopted.   
Cavusoglu et al. (2005; 2008) demonstrated that firms incur lower costs when they use the game theory as 
opposed to the decision theory. According to them, the firm’s payoff is maximized when the firm credibly 
commits and communicates its strategy to the hacker. Even if the communication of strategy is not credible, the 
firm enjoys a higher payoff if the firm and attacker play a sequential game. Their research focused on the overall 
economics of investment in information security.  
Sallhammar and Knapskog (2004) built upon the work of Alpcan and Başar, 2003; Liu, Zang, and Yu, 2005; Lye 
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and Wing, 2005 and modeled a security breach as a series of state changes from an initially se
compromised state. They used game theory to model and compute the probabilities of malicious user actions.
Loss of integrity implies that purity of an information system has been compromised in some way. This loss of 
integrity could be accidental or malicious. While accidental events are usually not recurring, once a malicious 
event occurs, the perpetrator is usually emboldened to carry out further attacks. These events carry huge 
financial and reputational risks for the organization concerned
intentional events can viewed as a series of changes from an initially uncompromised state to a state that 
represents a severe loss of integrity. 
In order to successfully carry out a history dependent attack, 
that each breaches the integrity of the system, but does not necessarily cause a monetary loss. For example, in 
order to obtain fraudulent disbursement, a fraudulent invoice, payroll slip, expense repo
must be created. Some of these may require additional documents. In order to support a fraudulent pay slip, it 
may be necessary to substantiate it with a forged timecard. 
In this paper, we are not concerned with the actual nature of
and/or confidentiality of the system would eventually cause a loss, if undetected would constitute a fraud. Given 
a measure of how long it takes for a fraudster to compromise the system, it would be easy to 
to scan that length of time and corresponding volume of transactions to detect potential frauds. If it scans for a 
shorter period of time, it is likely to miss the fraud. We use the approach of Sallhammar and Knapskog (2004) 
and demonstrate how their model can be used to determine the timing of audit in an continuous audit system. 
From a programming standpoint, the audit modules are subroutines that are executed when certain criteria set by 
the auditor are met. In this environment, the audi
will be subject to audit once a trigger event occurs. A trigger event could be, for example, queries or transactions 
from a particular user, which is far in excess of the usual number of trans
historical usage patterns. While Sallhammar and Knapskog (2004) proposed a model to quantify security, in this 
paper we look at how the model can be adapted to improve the effectiveness of continuous audit system. In 
particular, this paper attempts to determine that extent of transactions to scan in order to detect a potentially 
malicious attempt.  
The problem of determining audit timing and volume has been studied analytically by two other researchers, 
Hughes (1977), and Morey and Dittman (1986). Hughes (1977) modeled the audit timing problem as an infinite 
state time varying Markov decision process and solved it using dynamic programming.  Morey and Dittman 
(1986) attempted to determine optimal elapsed time between audits or
should occur before an audit should be initiated. They used two models, one for protecting against overstatement 
errors and the other for both overstatement and understatement. They provided a closed form solution
for determining the optimal timing of audit. Both these researchers did not consider the possibility of deliberate 
fraud. Instead, they assumed that errors occur at a finite rate and that these errors are caused by non
factors. 
The key contribution of current study is the determination of audit timing and volume in an continuous audit 
system. In traditional audits, the timing and periodicity is usually determined by statute (in most countries, 
statutory audits are annual and internal au
inadequate in an CAS. To the best of our knowledge, this paper represents one of the first attempts to determine 
the timing and frequency of audits through game theoretic methods. 
 
3. Mathematical model and empirical test
In the state transition diagram as shown in figure 1 (appendix), the present state of the system depends only on 
the past state. And the time spent in any given state is stochastic. In case the fraudster fails at an inter
state (state i) and resigns, the system continues to remain in a compromised state until the audit system restores it 
back to a pristine state. 
An information system’s fraud-free operating time is modeled as having an exponential distribution. The 
exponential distribution is widely used in modeling system reliability (
Chander, 2008) due to its memory less property. Experimental data from an experiment on intrusion detection 
experiment also supports the view that an
security (Goseva-Popstojanova et al., 2001
as an exponential distribution (whose cumulative distribution function is given 
(where λfraudis the average rate at which fraudulent transactions are intitated). Thus,  
 
Once a fraudulent transaction is initiated, the system enters state 
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. In a state space model, these malicious and 
 
the fraudster must often carry out a series of actions 
 
 fraud. Any action that undermines the integrity 
tor needs to specify the extent and timing of transactions that 
actions from that user based on 
 the number of financial transactions that 
dits are usually conducted on a quarterly basis). These strategies are 
 
 
Littlewood et al., 1993
 exponential distribution can be applied to modeling information 
). The time between any two successive fraudulent entries is modeled 
by 
 
i = 1. The time for the next fraudulent entry 
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(1/λi) and the time needed for the audit subsystem to detect (1/
also modeled by exponential distributions.
and
and  are the cumulative dis
respectively. Thus, and  will be the respective mean time that a fraudster and the system spend in state 
the model. State i represent an intermediate situation, where t
fraudulent transactions, but no monetary loss has occurred. The two processes, 
fraudster and the audit process can be merged into one Poisson process. Now due to 
the exponential distribution, the state transition model can be transformed into a continuous time Markov chain 
(CTMC) with discrete space (Ross, 2006
{X(t): t ≥ 0}, Xs= {0,1,2,…, n},  
where, the subscript s refers to the state the system is in. Thus, if 
time t. The model as described here is shown in Figure 2 in appendix. 
At each intermediate state i, the fraudster has two possible courses of action. S
next step in the fraud or she can cease and desist from the fraud. The probability of continuing with the fraud is 
, and the probability that she would cease is 
with the fraud has to be computed, since at each stage she will evaluate the payoff of continuing with the fraud. 
Also, in order for the fraud to have financial repercussions, at each step the fraudster must succeed. The 
probability of success in each case must also be computed and this is indicated by 
incorporated into the model.  
The fraudsters and the audit module’s action rates and the transition probabilities allow the computation of the 
instantaneous transition rates between state
and the state between state 
Since the stochastic model is a continuous time Markov chain, it is possible to compute the limiting probabilities 
of each state in the model. The transition probabilities are also shown in Figure 2. In order for Markov chain to 
have a steady state solution, the rate at which the transition to state 
out of state i. This results in a series of ba
probability of being in fraudulent state, 
With this information one can compute the mean time taken for the fraudster to commit the first fraud with the 
following equation.  
Mean time to first loss from fraud   =  
For a system that starts in an initially secure state, this metric provides a quantitative measure of the system’s 
ability to maintain integrity.  
To illustrate, consider a transaction processin
compliance with business rules, and are concurrently checked for abnormalities to ensure that they are not 
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µi) and restore the system to the pristine state 0 are 
 
 , respectively. 
tribution function of fraud process and the audit process 
he system has been compromised by the entry of 
and 
the memoryless property of 
), formally described as,  
X(t)=2, it implies that the system is in state 2 at 
 
he can either continue with the 
. At each stage i, the probability that
i and state i+1:  
i and state 0 as 
i occurs should match the rate of transitions 
lance equations. Solving these equations, one can obtain the stationary 
.  
 
 . 
g environment, where transactions are examined to ensure 
www.iiste.org 
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 and has been 
 
European Journal of Business and Management
ISSN 2222-1905 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2839 (Online)
Vol.6, No.18, 2014 
 
erroneous. A transaction that is compliant with normal business rules may still be abnormal.
assume that a system checks the orders entered by salespersons to ensure that they are not erroneous or 
fraudulent. The system could compare the order entered with previous history of orders entered by a particular 
salesperson to ensure that orders are free from error or fraud. Suppose, at a particular point in time, the system 
detects that an order entry by a salesperson is four times the average order for that salesperson. Such transactions 
may need further validation or investigation. In th
constitute an attempt at fraud.  The CAS may need to scan several similar transactions before it can assess the 
probability that the transaction may be fraudulent. The above metric provides an estimat
must elapse for someone to commit fraud on an initially pristine system. This time estimate, in turn, provides an 
estimate of the volume of transactions that must be scanned to have a reasonable chance of detecting the fraud.
One issue to be addressed in the above model is the probability of continuing with the fraud at each state. One of 
the ways is to run an experiment on a real system and observe the actual actions of persons (
and Kaâniche, 1999). This is an extremely
the use of game theory to estimate this probability, 
a game, where a fraudster’ choice of action is based on his utility der
benefits and costs of the fraud. The actions of the audit module and the fraudster can be modeled as a two player 
simultaneous game. In each state the fraudster has two possible courses of action, either to continue t
withdraw.  
The fraudster and the audit module have two actions each:
, represents the action that changes the state of the system from 
discovering a weakness in the control system, initiates o
ri, represents the action, wherein the fraudster decides to resign and desists from carrying out any other actions.
di, represents the action where the audit module detects the fraud. 
Φi, represents the action (or situation) where the audit module fails to detect the fraud. 
A game model can be constructed for each state 
defined by  
N(number of players) ={1, 2} = {fraudster, audit 
Ai(Action Set)= {fi, ri , di, Φi}, and  
is the payoff received by the fraudster for each possible combination of action and 
response by the audit module. Here, we are assuming a zero sum game, where the payoff received by the 
fraudster is exactly equal loss suffered by the audit system. 
 =  
 
fi 
ri 
 
In the above case, the fraudster’s expected payoff for a course of action is, 
νi(fi) = p(di) · γi1 + p(Φi) · γi2 
νi(ri) = p(di) · γi3 + p(Φi) · γi4 
Given that a fraudster is unlikely to know the exact probability of being detected, he can assume that the audit 
module is rational and seeks to minimize the expected payoff of the fraudster. If one assumes a zero sum game, 
where one player gain is another’s loss, th
(Gibbons, 1992).  
To summarize, we have a stochastic model that depicts a fraud as a series of state transitions from a initially un 
compromised state to a compromised state through one or 
has to evaluate the risk vs. reward trade off of continuing with the fraud or desisting from continuing with the 
fraud. The game theory model determines this risk vs. reward tradeoff and provides an inp
model.  The stochastic model outputs the time required to commit the fraud, assuming the system starts of in 
clean state. The estimate of time indirectly provides an estimate of the volume of transactions to be examined.
 
4. Model testing 
Consider a scenario wherein an employee creates a fraudulent invoice and submits it to his employer and the 
employer makes a payment based on the fraudulent invoice. In order to successfully carry out the fraud, the 
perpetrator must have generated a fraud
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e above scenario, a single abnormal transaction may not 
 resource-intensive approach. Another less resource intensive way is 
pi(f). One can view each transition in the stochastic model as 
ived from a rational considerations of 
 
i to i+1. This is when a fraudster upon 
r continues a fraud by entering a fraudulent transaction. 
 
 
i in the stochastic model. The game model 
module} 
 
di Φi 
  
  
 
e minimax solution of the game is the Nash Equilibrium of the game 
more intermediate states. At each state the fraudster 
ulent purchase order and a fraudulent goods received note, before the 
www.iiste.org 
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e of how much time 
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fraudulent invoice is paid.  In this scenario, 
Initially, the system has no fraudulent entries and is in a pristine state. We call this State 0.
The fraudster realizes that the system h
She initiates the fraud by first entering a fraudulent purchase order, circumventing any controls. The system 
enters State 2, an intermediate state. 
In case the fraudster’s transaction continues un
paid in due course. The fraud would then be complete.  
At each stage(except state 0 and 1), the audit module will have an opportunity to detect the fraud and take 
corrective action to rollback the transaction and restore the integrity of the system. In a database, in order to 
prevent an unwarranted inference only the last query has to be prevented but the audit module must remember to 
scan an unspecified number of previous transactions.
The stochastic model for this is depicted in Figure 3. To make the exposition easier, the fraudster’s payoff 
function at each state is assumed to be as given below.
γi =  
 
Fraud 
Resign 
This implies that if the fraudster enters a fraudulent transaction and remains undetected she will receive a 
positive payoff (γi2 = 2). In case the fraud is detected or if the fraudster resigns, the pa
she gives up after being detected, the payoff is zero.
The minmax strategy which will provide the highest payoff to the fraudster is given by,
0.25  
The other numerical values are as given as given below:
● The probability of fraud (
distribution, the probability that a single event will occur during the time interval is proportional to the size of 
the interval. 
● Probability of committing the first step in a fraud (
● Probability of committing the second step in the fraud (
● Probability of that the first step (
● Probability of that the second step
● Probability of audit module detecting the fraud in the first stage (
● Probability of audit module detecting the fraud in the second stage (
By inserting the values from the above table into the following set of equations, we can calculate the mean time 
before the first loss from fraud occurs. 
Mean time to first loss from fraud   =  
We can now answer the question that is posed in the
will need to examine the data or transactions relating to the last 17 days in order to detect the loss of 
confidentiality or integrity.   
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as vulnerabilities and decides to commit fraud (State 1). 
detected, she finally enters the fraudulent invoice which later gets 
 
 
 
detected undetected 
-1 2 
0 -1 
yoff would be negative. If 
 
 
 
) is 1 in 1,000,000. Note that since we are using Poisson 
) is 1 in 20,000. 
) is 1 in 20,000. 
) will succeed is 90%. 
 ( ) will succeed is 70%. 
) is 1 in 80,000.
) is 1 in 4,000.
 
 
 = 17.07 days. 
 problem statement. Give the assumptions above the CAS 
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In order to examine the internal validity of the model, we per
examining the results. The first parameter, 
, is the probability of continuing with the fraud at each stage, which is 
model. The results are presented in Table 1.
We see from Table 1, that when the initial probability of fraud increases from 1 in 1,000,000 to 1 in 100, the 
audit interval decreases from 17 days to 13 days. The increase in th
increased probability of fraud, but it is not a linear relationship. While the probability of fraud increases 100
the increase in audit frequency is only about 30%. Similarly, when 
fraud at each stage decreases, there is a corresponding decrease in audit frequency. Again the relationship is non
linear. For example, when the probability decreases from 20% to 10%, the decrease in audit frequency is of the 
order of 17%. Note that the when the audit frequency decreases, the volume of transactions that are to be audited 
also correspondingly decreases. 
Note that the any change in the payoffs only affect 
reward from fraud outweighed the risk from detection, then the probability of continuing with the fraud goes up 
and this in turn reduces the audit frequency. 
We also look at the effect of varying the probability of success at each stage. The probability of s
first stage is  and the probability of success in the second stage is 
probabilities form 90% to 10% independently, while keeping the other variables constant, is shown in Table 2.
It can be seen that it as the probability of success reduces, the audit frequency decreases. This is makes intuitive 
sense as the when an organization has strong anti
implies that the need for frequent au
volume of transactions to be audited during each audit goes up.
 
5. Conclusions 
In current study, we present a simple model that probe at the expected behavior of a fraudster in an acco
transaction processing system. We have used a stochastic model to look at the behavior and of the system and 
used game theory for modeling the expected behavior of a fraudster.  This allows us to compute how far back a 
CAS must scan transactions in order to detect a potential breach of system security. A pressing concern while 
applying traditional external audit techniques to large transaction systems is that the audit data is gathered long 
after the economic events are recorded and is too late to
even when a detailed audit trail exists, examining the data after the fact does not prevent losses from occurring. 
This necessitates the evaluation of controls and data in real time or as close to r
systems are called continuous audit systems. There is a dire need to determine the volume, timing and frequency 
of the audit in continuous audit systems as it can materially affect the conclusions drawn from the data.  Given 
that a fraudster is unlikely to know the exact probability of being detected and can assume that the audit module 
is rational and seeks to maximize audit systems payoff, which is equivalent to minimizing the expected payoff of 
the fraudster in a zero sum game. In this scenario, the minimax solution of the game is the Nash Equilibrium of 
the game.  
This work presents some limitations as well. We have assumed one single profile for a potential perpetrator of 
fraud. However, realistically, there are many kinds of 
payoffs. An extension of this work would be extrapolating this model to include more than one type of threat to 
integrity. A further limitation of this model is that we are assuming that all informat
is known. This may not hold in practice. However, this limitation could be addressed in future studies by looking 
at game theoretic tools which can incorporate incomplete information as well.
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Figure 1: State Transition Diagram for Fraud 
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Figure 2: State Transition Rates
 
 
Figure 3: Stochastic Model of Fraud
 
 Days 
0.000001 17.08 
0.00001 14.49 
0.0001 13.19 
0.001 13.06 
0.01 13.05 
 
Table 1: Simulation Results 
 
Days 
0.9 17.08 
0.8 17.24 
0.7 17.44 
0.6 17.72 
0.5 18.11 
0.4 18.68 
0.3 19.65 
0.2 21.59 
0.1 27.36 
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 Days 
0.25 17.08 
0.20 17.73 
0.15 18.82 
0.10 20.99 
0.05 27.51 
 
 
Days 
 0.9 16.78 
 0.8 16.91 
 0.7 17.08 
 0.6 17.30 
 0.5 17.61 
 0.4 18.07 
 0.3 18.84 
 0.2 20.38 
 0.1 25.01 
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